LOT Polish Airlines (LO) became the first commercial carrier in the world to take Boeing to a jury trial over the 737 MAX crisis on 11 May 2026, Reuters reported. The proceedings commenced at the United States District Court in Seattle, Washington as the Polish national flag carrier, formally known as Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT S.A., alleged Boeing concealed critical safety deficiencies in the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) [which was a flight-control software feature embedded in the Boeing 737 MAX] while actively pitching the aircraft to LOT in 2016 as the cornerstone of a financial turnaround strategy.
LOT subsequently committed to leasing 15 aircraft, relying on Boeing’s core commercial promise that pilots already rated on earlier 737 variants would require no expensive simulator retraining to transition to the MAX. That promise, LOT argues, was built on a concealment. Boeing’s engineers were simultaneously wrestling with the aircraft’s aerodynamic tendency to pitch its nose upward under specific flight conditions, developing MCAS as the corrective software fix — and then, according to LOT’s legal team, deliberately minimising the system’s scope when communicating with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to prevent regulators from mandating the very simulator training Boeing had promised airlines they would not need.
The 20-month global grounding of the 737 MAX that followed two fatal crashes — Lion Air (JT) Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines (ET) Flight 302 in March 2019, together killing 346 people — derailed LOT’s recovery plan entirely. The airline filed suit against Boeing in October 2021 seeking no less than $250 million in compensation for grounding-related revenue losses, and the case is expected to run until approximately 26 May 2026, with both parties confirming to AFP that they declined to comment on proceedings.
LOT’s $250 Million Claim Centers on Boeing’s Promise of Minimal Pilot Retraining
The gravitational centre of LOT’s legal argument is not that MCAS existed, but that Boeing deliberately understated its scope. Opening statements on 11 May from LOT’s lead attorney, Anthony Battista, were unambiguous. Reuters reported that Battista told jurors directly that “this case is about Boeing’s lies and deception and the devastating financial harm it caused“.
In 2016, Boeing was engaged in an intense narrowbody competition with Airbus’s A320 family for thousands of orders worldwide, and the MAX’s principal advantage over the A320neo was that incumbent 737 operators could transition their pilots using a brief computer-based training module rather than full simulator hours.
Maciej Wilk, a former LOT executive who took the stand on the trial’s opening day, told jurors that switching to an Airbus alternative would have demanded costly simulator training for LOT’s entire pilot corps. Per Reuters’ court reporting, Wilk stated: “And the key promise in all this was about pilot training” for the 737 MAX.
On that assurance, LOT committed to leasing 15 jets over two years, entirely unaware of MCAS or its operational characteristics. The company’s fleet manager also underwent questioning on the trial’s first day, per court papers published that evening.
The airline’s formal claim, filed in October 2021, alleges “purposeful and negligent false representations and omissions concerning the 737 MAX aircraft.” LOT operated and leased 14 MAX aircraft at the time of the 2019 grounding and currently flies 26 Boeing 737 MAX 8 jets, with four additional units on order.
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What was MCAS and Why Boeing Downplayed It?
MCAS was a flight stabilisation feature engineered to address a specific aerodynamic characteristic of the 737 MAX that the earlier 737 Next Generation (737NG) did not exhibit. Boeing’s decision to mount the LEAP-1B engines further forward and higher on the MAX’s wing — dictated by the aircraft’s low ground clearance, a legacy of the original 737’s design dating to 1967 — gave the jet a propensity to pitch its nose upward at high angles of attack.
Rather than pursue a structural redesign, Boeing developed MCAS as a software-driven corrective that would automatically trim the horizontal stabiliser nose-down when specific flight parameters were met. The strategic objective was explicit: as The Air Current’s definitive reporting documented, a Boeing technical pilot wrote in internal communications just weeks after the MAX’s certification in 2017: “I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from 737 NG to MAX. Boeing will not allow that to happen.”
The FAA’s 2016 approval of MCAS certification was based on Boeing’s assurances that the system could not fail hazardously or catastrophically. As the Harvard Law School corporate governance analysis documented, MCAS relied on input from a single angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor — a single-point failure mode that Boeing’s safety analysis had rated as virtually inconceivable.
When a mis-calibrated AoA sensor on Lion Air Flight 610 (a Boeing 737 MAX 8, registration PK-LQP) fed erroneous data into MCAS on 29 October 2018, the system activated more than 20 times in succession, pushing the nose down against the pilots’ corrective inputs until the aircraft struck the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (CGK), Tangerang, killing all 189 passengers and crew.
On 10 March 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET302 (registration ET-AVJ) crashed in nearly identical circumstances six minutes after departure from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport (ADD), killing all 157 aboard. The FAA and global regulators grounded the entire MAX fleet on 13 March 2019. Boeing, as Aerospace Global News notes, had intentionally omitted data about MCAS from pilot documentation, meaning neither crew had been trained to recognise or counter the system’s malfunction.
Here’s a comparison table of the two accidents:
| Category | Lion Air Flight 610 | Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 |
|---|---|---|
| Departure Airport | Soekarno–Hatta International Airport (CGK) | Addis Ababa Bole International Airport (ADD) |
| Destination Airport | Depati Amir Airport (PGK) | Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (NBO) |
| Fatalities | 189 | 157 |
| Survivors | 0 | 0 |
| Phase of Flight | Climb after takeoff | Climb after takeoff |
| Main Cause | Faulty angle-of-attack sensor triggered MCAS repeatedly | Faulty angle-of-attack sensor activated MCAS repeatedly |
| MCAS Role | MCAS forced nose-down inputs based on incorrect sensor data | MCAS repeatedly pushed aircraft nose-down despite pilot actions |
| Key Investigation Findings | Maintenance failures and inadequate pilot information contributed | Aircraft design issues and pilot difficulty countering MCAS identified |
| Aircraft Age | About 2 months old | About 4 months old |
| Grounding Impact | Prompted global scrutiny of Boeing 737 MAX | Led to worldwide grounding of all Boeing 737 MAX aircraft |
Boeing redesigned MCAS over the 20-month grounding period. The system now draws from both AoA sensors, activates only once per triggering event, and exerts force a single pilot can manually overcome — and regulators cleared the MAX to return to service in November 2020.
Boeing’s Defence Hinges on the Fact that LOT Continues to Fly the MAX Daily
Boeing entered the trial with a pointed rhetorical counter-offensive. Its attorney, in opening arguments reported by Reuters and re-published by Investing.com, accused LOT of “crying foul and fraud out of one side of their mouth in the courtroom” while simultaneously operating the 737 MAX every day across its European network. The attorney asked jurors directly: “Is that how the victim of a multimillion-dollar fraud scheme behaves?”
LOT currently operates 26 Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft. According to data from planespotters.net, These have an average of 4.1 years. Boeing’s defence will likely argue that LOT’s continued commercial use of the aircraft, and its continued acceptance of pending MAX deliveries (four are on order), undermines the carrier’s credibility of a fraud claim that hinges on the original 2016 sales process.
Boeing separately told Reuters it had already paid billions of dollars to the families of the 346 victims of the two crashes and had resolved airline grounding-related claims. The precise details remain undisclosed, though.
Boeing’s Broader Legal And Criminal Exposure
The LOT trial takes place against a backdrop of unresolved and partially resolved federal criminal liability that has shadowed Boeing for more than five years. In January 2021, the US Department of Justice charged Boeing with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States (specifically, the FAA’s Aircraft Evaluation Group) and simultaneously entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) that deferred prosecution for three years in exchange for a $2.5 billion settlement, compliance reforms, and ethics programme investments.
The agreement was due to expire when the January 2024 Alaska Airlines (AS) Flight 1282 door-plug blowout* placed the company’s production quality back under acute regulatory scrutiny. The DOJ subsequently declared Boeing in breach of the DPA in May 2024.
*In this case, four bolts were never reinstalled at Boeing’s Renton factory
Boeing agreed in July 2024 to plead guilty to the fraud charge in a revised deal that would have imposed a fine of up to $487.2 million, but US District Court Judge Reed O’Connor rejected the proposed plea agreement in December 2024, citing concerns over the selection process for an independent compliance monitor.
The DOJ and Boeing ultimately finalised a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in May 2025 under which Boeing agreed to pay or invest more than $1.1 billion, comprising a $487.2 million criminal fine (with $243.6 million credited from the earlier DPA payment), a $444.5 million victims’ compensation fund, and $445 million in compliance, safety, and quality programme investments, per NBC New York reported.
On 31 March 2026, a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Boeing’s 2024 breach of the DPA had rendered that agreement moot, as the DOJ’s own published case record affirms.
That settlement awarded no restitution to airline customers as the court found Boeing’s conduct had not directly harmed carriers in the legal sense relevant to the criminal proceedings.
Parallel MAX Litigation: Southwest Pilots, The Shikha Garg Verdict, And Expanding Liability
The LOT trial arrives in the context of a still-expanding litigation landscape in which Boeing faces simultaneous legal exposure from crash victims’ families, airline customers, shareholders, and, most recently, its own carrier partners’ pilot workforces.
In May 2026, approximately 10,000 Southwest Airlines (WN) pilots filed a lawsuit against Boeing, alleging Boeing induced their 2016 collective bargaining agreement by marketing the MAX as a continuation of the existing 737 family requiring no additional pilot training, while concealing that the LEAP-1B engines shifted the aircraft’s centre of gravity, increased pitch-up and stall risk, and materially altered handling characteristics. The Southwest pilots claim they would not have agreed to include the MAX in their contract, or would have bargained for different terms, had they known these facts.
The most financially significant civil verdict to date in the MAX saga was handed down on 12 November 2025, when a federal jury in Chicago ordered Boeing to pay more than $28 million to the family of Shikha Garg, who was a 32-year-old United Nations environmental consultant who died aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. As we previously reported, the total compensation, including 26% interest and an additional $3.45 million awarded to Garg’s husband, reached $35.85 million — and marked the first civil jury verdict in any of the dozens of crash-related lawsuits.
By 2021, Boeing had already paid out $1.77 billion to airlines globally for grounding-related financial losses
The Has Record Orders but Unresolved Accountability Still There
Boeing’s commercial recovery from the MAX crisis has been numerically striking, even as the legal proceedings multiply. The manufacturer produced 2,233 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft as of March 2026, and the type commands a backlog of 4,870 outstanding orders. Boeing opened its fourth 737 MAX production line at its Paine Field Everett facility (PAE) in mid-2026.
We had also previosuly detailed in April 2026 that the new “North Line” is designed to gradually raise output from 38–42 aircraft per month toward 47, and ultimately to 63 per month over several years. Boeing production leader Jennifer Boland-Masterson summarised the philosophy guiding the ramp-up:
“It’s like running. We know how to do it, and we’ve done it before, but we need to warm up our muscles. You don’t start with a marathon. You start with shorter distances and build up from there.”
The day after LOT’s opening statements in Seattle, Boeing reported its strongest monthly order intake of 2026, booking 135 net new aircraft including 57 Boeing 737 MAX jets. Boeing’s year-to-date net order total of 284 aircraft represents the strongest four-month commercial start since 2014.
All in All
Simple Flying’s analysis noted that LOT currently flies over four times as many MAX jets as 737-800s — a fleet composition that reflects not ideological commitment to the type but operational and contractual entrenchment.
LOT’s financial turnaround in the mid-2010s was explicitly architected around the MAX’s economics: the aircraft offered superior fuel efficiency relative to the Boeing 737NG and could be operated by LOT’s existing pilot pool without the simulator training investment that an Airbus A320neo transition would have entailed.
When the grounding arrived in March 2019, LOT was more exposed than most: it had fewer alternative aircraft to redeploy and a recovery narrative that had been publicly linked to the MAX’s economics. The simultaneous onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, compounding the 20-month grounding, further deepened the financial damage.
LOT’s then-president, Rafał Milczarski, acknowledged the severity of the losses when announcing the lawsuit in October 2021, telling journalists via Aviation 24’s earlier reporting: “We will not let go and we cannot let go of anything that Boeing owes us. It is a natural thing and we will make such claims against Boeing.”
Settlement talks with Boeing had previously failed to reach satisfactory terms. The trial now represents LOT’s only remaining avenue for public resolution.